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Abstract  
Three persuasive narratives of the US subprime crisis are explored with reference both to theory and to 
emergency acts of public policy undertaken.  First the role of pecuniary externalities that amplify any shocks to 
the quality of risk-assets held by Investment Banks and others.  Second is adverse selection in marketing these 
assets; and third the role of financial panic in making investment-banking disaster-prone. How relevant these 
differing perspectives proved is attested by the nature of state support and by subsequent findings in courts of 
law. 
As Chair of the US Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen argued that vulnerabilities within the US financial system in the 
mid-2000s were “numerous and familiar from past financial panics”. That the varied threats to stability featuring 
in these narratives should be complements and not substitutes is of more than technical interest: it helps to 
explain why the US financial system was so exposed to radical failure. 
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Reality is one, though wise men speak of it variously.     From the Rigveda, 1500 - 1200 BC 
  Introduction 
If financial markets are efficient, how to explain the near-collapse of the global financial system in 2007-2009? 
The answer given by Andrew Lo is that ‘the Efficient Markets Hypothesis isn’t wrong, it’s incomplete. ... Academia, 
industry and public policy have assumed rational economic behaviour for so long that we’ve forgotten about the 
other aspects of human behavior, aspects that don’t fit as neatly into a mathematically precise framework.’ 
Adaptive Markets (2017, pp.3,9).  
Economists such as George Akerlof and Robert Shiller had already adopted such a wider perspective, as in their 
2009 monograph on Animal Spirits. With special reference to financial markets, Andrew Lo advocates an 
evolutionary approach which allows for the sophisticated procedures which promote market efficiency in normal 
times to be over-ruled by instinctive behaviour in face of the unexpected. To motivate such a multi-faceted view 
of financial markets, where neatly calculated rationality can be combined with elemental fear and greed, he 
appeals to an analogy - the ancient Hindu parable of the five blind monks who encounter an elephant for the first 
time. 
Being blind from birth, they have no idea what this strange creature is, but when one monk feels the 
elephant’s leg, he concludes “an elephant is just like a tree,” and when another monk feels the trunk, he 
disagrees, saying “an elephant is just like a snake”, and so on. Each monk’s impression is technically 
correct but they all miss the bigger picture.                                                         Lo (2017, p.3) 
It is in this spirit that we consider three narratives that have been proposed to explain the global financial crisis - 
each seemingly sufficient, but each drawing on different aspects of market performance and human behaviour.  
The first of these focuses on the presence of externalities as the primary explanation of why markets failed – with 
the added twist that in financial markets these show up as ‘pecuniary’ externalities2 that distort asset prices. The 
second narrative is based on the challenge that asymmetric information can pose for market efficiency. The 
                                                          
2 As defined in the review of the literature that follows.  
2 
 
insights that George Akerlof (1970) illustrated with respect to markets for second hand cars can, it seems,  also be 
applied to markets in financial assets  - though equilibrium may not have the ‘rational expectations’ property 
which he imposed. The third narrative examined, financial panic, relies most explicitly on instinctive patterns of 
human behaviour. Panic evidently did play a role in the crisis, though the view of Gary Gorton that investor ‘Panic 
of 2007’ was the essential trigger of the global financial crisis is open to dispute. 
As a guide to judging the relevance of these narratives, we look first and foremost at how the monetary and fiscal 
authorities chose to act as they strove to avoid a repeat of the Great Depression. How did those in charge of 
lender of last resort facilities or credit guarantees, for example - or tax-payer funded capital injections - react 
when faced with evolving crisis?  Reference is also made to judgements made in the courts of law; for it is here, 
we believe, that the allegations of market manipulation by those with superior information were most clearly 
tested. What does the evidence collected by prosecutors - and the judgements that followed - reveal?   
While these narratives throw light on different aspects of the crisis, the evidence suggests the crisis was so severe 
because all had a part to play.  
A selective overview of relevant literature  
 
Figure 1 U.S. Subprime mortgage originations.       Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report, p.70.  
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To set the scene with institutional and policy background, a key reading is the Report of the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission (2011).  In Figure 1 taken from this report, one sees for example the dramatic increase in 
the share of subprime mortgages in all mortgage originations - almost tripling from 2003 to 2006 – only to fall 
precipitously when the house-price bubble burst, with virtually none being securitized in 2008. For reasons of 
space, however, we restrict ourselves here to discussing academic contributions bearing directly on the chosen 
narratives3. 
First is the paper presented at Jackson Hole by Raghuram Rajan (2005) which famously asked whether financial 
development has made the world riskier. The focus of his concern was how the combination of leverage and 
asymmetric information in financial intermediation could lead to excessive risk-taking.  Though his critique met 
with general scepticism, it was supported by Hyun Shin, on the ground that - even with common knowledge - high 
leverage could lead to instability on account of pecuniary externalities that can arise when agents are subject to 
financial constraints which depend on aggregate state variables such as the market value of capital assets4.  In an 
iconic metaphor, Shin (2005 ) used the internal dynamics of London’s Millenium Bridge to illustrate how shocks 
can be greatly amplified by externalities in financial markets - ‘the supreme example of an environment where 
individuals react to what’s happening around them, and where individuals’ actions affect the outcomes 
themselves’.  
 In another influential paper delivered at Jackson Hole soon after the crisis broke, Gary Gorton (2009) argued that 
lack of transparency in financial innovation could trigger financial panic. It was, he argued, the ‘loss of  
information’ involved in securitisation and the consequent ‘opacity’ of MBS securities in terms of their asset 
backing that was the root of the crisis - though this view did not pass unchallenged.  
                                                          
3 A summary background guide to official housing policy is, however, provided in Miller et al. (2016, 2017).  
4 As Davila and Korinek (2015) observe:  “Intuitively, when agents are subject to a binding constraint that depends on 
aggregate variables, a planner internalizes that she can modify allocations to relax financial constraints. For example, the 
planner may reduce fire sales to raise the value of capital assets that serve as collateral, which raises the borrowing 
capacity of constrained agents.” Further discussion of pecuniary externalities is provided in Miller and Zhang (2015).  
4 
 
Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) also stressed the role of financial development; but, in marked contrast to the 
bank-focussed perspectives just discussed, theirs is a general equilibrium approach5.  They stress the role of 
heterogeneous beliefs as the driver of leverage as optimists borrow from pessimists; and how the sequential 
introduction of financial innovations is, in and of itself, enough to cause boom and bust. Lying between detailed 
partial equilibrium models of banking and ‘institution free’ general equilibrium,  another fast-growing branch of 
the literature focuses on adding ‘financial frictions’  to DSGE models cast in the Gali/Woodford tradition of 
modern macroeconomics. Though we make no attempt to discuss these contributions here, a good illustration of 
the DSGE approach, with a helpful summary of the literature in this burgeoning field, is available in Coimbra and 
Rey (2017).  
The majority of papers on the financial crisis take a partial equilibrium perspective – with a focus on ‘shadow 
banking’ in particular.  As usual, there is a split between those, like Gary Gorton, who emphasize the role of 
shocks to confidence in a setting where fundamentals are essentially well-founded, and those who focus on 
structural flaws in incentives and/or the regulatory structure which can precipitate insolvency due to excess risk-
taking.   
 Prudential regulation to check excess risk-taking by highly-leveraged institutions was widely discussed well before 
the subprime crisis as Goodhart (2011) testifies. A key issue in debate was whether the VaR6 rules - to be adopted 
in Basel II to check risk-taking by individual banks - would be sufficient to guarantee systemic stability; or whether 
they could be flawed for ignoring externalities.   A masterly survey of the literature on the problems posed by 
such externalities is provided by Brunnermeier et al. (2012).  
An issue that they leave on one side, however, is that of distorted incentives due to asymmetric information, an 
issue analysed earlier by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Hellman et al. (2000), for example. How financial 
innovation could exacerbate this problem – as high-lighted by Rajan (2005) -  was emphasized by Foster and 
Young (2010) by showing how fund-managers of average ability could use financial derivatives to ‘mimic’ the 
                                                          
5 A concise summary of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) is available in Miller et al. (2016). 
6 A Glossary of technical terms and abbreviations is to be found after Annex A. 
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performance of star traders, taking on ‘tail risk’ to do so7. In the context of US housing policy, where monitoring 
of asset quality had been delegated to unregulated private-enterprise Credit Rating agencies (CRAs), Akerlof and 
Shiller (2015) argued that investment banks had an alternative strategy for making their investments appear 
superior: getting them rated as AAA by compliant agencies! As with mimicry, however, getting high returns by 
manipulation involves taking on significant risk. 
Structure of the paper 
These issues – externalities, distorted incentives and financial panic – are analysed separately in Sections 1 to 3, 
considering in particular whether each could itself have been sufficient to cause severe banking crisis. 
In Section 1 we focus specifically on the Investment Banking model of Shin (2010) which emphasises how 
‘pecuniary externalities’ can amplify unexpected shocks regarding the quality of investments they hold. As a check 
on the robustness of US-style shadow banking in the face of shocks to perceived asset quality, we ask: could these 
externalities prove sufficiently strong that the simple reversal of ‘good news’  might lead to widespread 
insolvency and banking collapse?  
The second narrative involves distorted incentives for risk-taking in HLIs, particularly after the switch from 
partnerships to limited liability in US Investment Banking, as discussed in Akerlof and Shiller (2015, Chapter 2). 
Here we apply the adverse selection approach of Akerlof (1970) to the marketing of subprime assets where there 
is asymmetric information between buyers and sellers. Relaxing the ‘rational expectations’ constraint imposed in 
that paper allows for risks to be concealed by inflated ratings issued by CRAs who are ‘mining their reputation’ to 
secure the fees on offer for rating subprime loans - leading eventually to financial collapse, when it is discovered 
that these loans were worth a lot less than advertised. Note that the twin threats to bank solvency posed in these 
narrative are, in fact, complementary:  if pecuniary externalities greatly amplify ‘news shocks’ on asset quality, 
                                                          
7 This strategy offers the prospect of high returns for some time, followed by substantial losses as tail risks finally 
materialise. 
6 
 
collusion between investment banks and the rating agencies can provide the shocks – with inflated ratings on the 
upside, and true revelation on the downside.  
The third narrative to be explored is the ‘confidence crisis’ view and we ask: was the rise in the cost of insuring 
subprime assets a matter of mindless panic? Or was it not due to a realisation of faulty fundamentals?  
What if these various perspectives are high-lighting different aspects of a complex reality, as in the parable of the 
blind monks and the elephant? The conclusion in the Rigveda as regards the parable of the elephant - that Reality 
is one, though wise men speak of it variously - tempts one to ask: should these seemingly conflicting accounts not 
be combined? For an answer we turn to the evidence of law courts and the actions of policy-makers in the Fed 
and Treasury.  
To weigh these perspectives in the balance – and to see whether in practice they proved complementary – 
Section 4 summarizes key official policy actions taken in response to the crisis; and subsequent findings in the law 
courts in respect of CRAs and Investment Banks. In some versions of the parable a sighted observer appears to 
reconcile the various conflicting perspectives. In this spirit, the retrospective view of the then-chair of the Federal 
Reserve, as expressed at Jackson Hole 2017, is also cited.  Section 5 concludes.  
Section 1  The first narrative: ‘pecuniary externalities’ or levitation by leverage  
Rajan (2005) may have warned that HLIs would take on too much risk; but the rules adopted by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision seemed to offer an appropriate regulatory counter-balance: that the equity of 
the institution involved should cover (almost) all the risk exposure as measured by Value-at-Risk (VaR).  Because 
these rules took no account of the effect of bank behaviour on asset prices -  and so, via mark-to-market 
accounting,  on banks’ own equity - such VaR-based regulation had been roundly criticised as no guarantee of 
systemic stability in the ‘LSE critique’ of Danielsson et al. (2001)8.  In this section, we use the Investment Banking 
model subsequently developed by Hyun Shin, one of the authors, to examine the amplification effects that come 
through this channel; and whether they could trigger systemic collapse. We find that the effect of externalities is 
                                                          
8 As discussed further in Miller(2018) 
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potentially ‘catastrophic’, in that the representative Investment Bank could become insolvent when a significant 
upgrade in risky asset quality is followed by its subsequent reversal.  
In what, for convenience, will be referred to simply as the Shin model, there are two groups of investors; risk 
averse agents with mean-variance preferences who do not use leverage to finance investments, such as pension 
funds and mutual funds; and risk- neutral investors, who can finance investments with leverage subject to a 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint. For present purposes, we will treat the latter as homogenous and highly-leveraged 
investment banks, though in reality such active leveraged investors include hedge funds and foreign banks, as well 
as U.S. investment banks.  
The Shin model 
There are two assets: (1) a riskless bond with its rate of return normalized to 0; and (2) a risky asset with random 
payoff Q, uniformly distributed over [q − z, q + z] where q > 0, with moments denoted by: 𝐸[𝑄] = 𝑞 and 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑄) =
𝑧2
3
  . Both types of investors are endowed with initial equity equal to e. Investors’ portfolio payoff (end 
of period wealth) is  𝑊 ≡ 𝑄𝑦 + (𝑒 − 𝑝𝑦), where y represents quantity of the risky asset holdings and p is the 
price of the risky asset. 
Passive investors 
As they do not borrow to finance their investments, risk-averse investors are categorised as ‘passive’. Their 
‘mean-variance’ preferences are described by  𝑈(𝑊) ≡ 𝐸(𝑊) −
1
2𝜏
𝜎𝑊
2  , where τ represents risk tolerance and, 
since their portfolios comprise of only riskless bonds and risky asset, portfolio variance is  𝜎𝑊
2 =
𝑦2𝑧2
3
. Risk averse 
investor’s optimization thus becomes: max
𝑦
(𝑞𝑦 + (𝑒 − 𝑝𝑦) −
𝑦2𝑧2
6𝜏
) ; so the demand function of passive investors 
is: 𝑦𝑃 = {
3𝜏
𝑍2
(𝑞 − 𝑝)       𝑖𝑓              𝑞 > 𝑝  
0                      𝑖𝑓     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                                                         (1) 
Note that, because of the assumption on mean-variance preferences, the demand for risky asset by the passive 
investors is independent of their wealth. 
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Active investors: Investment Banks 
Risk-neutral investors are ‘active’ as they use leverage – issuing debt -  to finance their investments, subject to a 
VaR constraint.  Specifically, investment banks’ optimization is described as: max
𝑦
𝐸(𝑊)        𝑠. 𝑡.        𝑉𝑎𝑅 = (𝑝 −
𝑞 + 𝑧)𝑦 ≤ 𝑒  where 𝐸(𝑊) = (𝑞 − 𝑝)𝑦 + 𝑒 and the VaR constraint implies that borrowing is no greater than can 
be financed with the worst realized payoff on the risky asset, 𝑝𝑦 − 𝑒 ≤ (𝑞 − 𝑧)𝑦. 
Since 𝐸(𝑊) is linear in y, then for q > p, so long as the VaR constraint is binding, the demand for risky assets by 
investment banks becomes:   𝑦𝐴 = {
𝑒
𝑧−(𝑞−𝑝)
      𝑖𝑓    𝑞 > 𝑝  
0                   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                         (2) 
Market-clearing; and how shocks to quality get amplified  
For 𝑞 > 𝑝 and fixed aggregate supply of risky assets, normalised at 1, the market clearing condition 𝑦𝑃 + 𝑦𝐴 = 1 
determines the equilibrium price:  𝑝 = 𝑞 −
𝑧
2
[
𝑧
3𝜏
+ 1 − √(
𝑧
3𝜏
− 1)
2
+
4𝑒
3𝜏
 ]     (3) 
For the given supply of risk assets on the horizontal axis, various market equilibria are illustrated in Figure 2.  The 
construction in the Figure is that the demand by passive investors, measured from the right-hand axis, lies below 
the mean, q, with a slope that reflects their degree of risk-tolerance, τ. Demand for active investors is measured 
from the left hand axis, with the kink reflecting their initial equity 𝑒 and the downward slope indicating, not risk 
aversion, but the effect of the VaR rule (whereby  a fall in price allows more assets to be held as there is less risk-
per-asset, measured as  𝑝 − ( 𝑞 − 𝑧), to be covered by their equity). Equilibrium is where total demand matches 
supply; and, when risk assets are reckoned to be of Low-quality,  this is where  the demand curves shown in bold  
intersect at L. If this assessment were to be revised, however, so that they are judged to be of High-quality, 
equilibrium shifts to the right to H, with a considerable expansion of holdings by investment banks triggered 
thereby, as described formally in the Annex. (The outcome on the left, where Investment Banks go out of 
business, is labelled I for insolvency.)  
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The quality of assets available at L is calibrated to have an expected payoff 𝑞 of 1.06 and a maximum downside 
risk 𝑧 of 0.26, giving the minimum payoff of 𝑞 − 𝑧 = 0.8  indicated by the red dashed line near the foot of the 
figure.  The demand schedule for such assets from Investment banks, subject to VaR with equity of 0.03, has a 
kink at 
𝑒
𝑧
= 0.12; then descends towards 0.8 as its lower asymptote. It intersects the demand from passive 
investors, with risk tolerance τ = 0.8, at a price of 0.88, giving investment banks a one third share of the market, 
see Table 1. 
What if there is an unanticipated increase in the perceived quality of risk assets?  Specifically, let the expected 
payoff rise by five points, 𝑑𝑞 ≡ 𝑞’ − 𝑞 =  0.05,  lifting the minimum payoff to 𝑞′ − 𝑧 = 0.86 as indicated by the 
upper red dashed line. The higher payoff will, of course, appeal to both types of investors, with their demand 
schedules shifting up by dq for initial equity values – which would raise  equilibrium vertically to N  in  the Figure.  
But this ignores the pecuniary externality induced by “mark-to-market” accounting by VaR investors which will 
amplify their fully-leveraged demand, as indicated in Annex A. This amplification will take  market-clearing 
equilibrium from N to H, where VaR investors now hold almost half of the risk assets (on which the risk-premium 
𝑞′– 𝑝′ has fallen substantially).  
 
Passive investors’ demand 
 IBs Demand   
L 
N 
H 
I 
Price 
p 
q 
q – z  
q’ 
q’ – z’  
 I     
Price 
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Figure 2. Market-clearing price of risky assets: three  equilibria (q=1.06, z=0.26, e=0.03, τ=0.08) 
 
 
Table 1 Calibration of initial equilibrium and effects of  dq= 0.05, subsequently reversed 
A test of robustness: what if the quality improvement is reversed?                                                                                        
As a ‘stress test’ of the robustness of equilibrium, let the unexpected increase in asset quality (corresponding to 
the highly favourable pre-crisis ratings given by the CRAs) be later reversed9, with the state-contingent sequence 
of events outlined below. Note that, for convenience, this stylised test considers successive equilibria at their 
distribution means (without reference to other stochastic  outcomes). 
                                                          
9 As, for example, when there is a sharp rise in the cost of insurance, see Figure 7 below. 
 
 
L 
I 
 
Passive investors’ demand 
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Figure 3 Sequence of events 
The initial equilibrium corresponds to point L in Figure 2.   After markets have cleared on the assumption of an 
unchanging future distribution of asset returns, however, ‘good news’ on asset quality arrives: the payoff to be 
expected has changed   q’ >q. This unanticipated but welcome development leads to a ‘boom’,  with pecuniary 
externalities leading to equilibrium at point H in Figure 2, with details in Table 1.  By marking assets to market at 
these higher prices, investors are effectively assuming no change in the future distribution of asset returns. They 
will, however, be disappointed, when ‘bad news’ arrives that asset quality has reverted back to what it was in the 
first stage.10 Returning to the original expected return of q , but starting from the higher equity base (𝑒) achieved 
in the boom – with larger holdings financed by higher borrowing (p’y’-𝑒) – raises  two  issues:  first, how much will 
asset prices have to fall as active investors contract their balance sheets to meet the now-tighter VaR 
requirements? Second, will their own equity be sufficient to take the hit?   
Insolvency 
Though news shocks that get reversed need not lead to insolvency, they can do so. The most obvious case is when 
the good news lifts the ‘band of downside risk’ high enough to exclude the initial equilibrium price p0 (i.e. 
                                                          
10 If the distribution of Q had unbounded support, we assume that the cost of CDS for insuring against the tail risks below 
q-z and q’-z are the same. 
Boom 
Price increases as 
does equity, 𝑒 > e 
Initial equilibrium 
Market-clearing with 
equity e and mean q 
“Good news” 
about asset quality: 
q rises to q’ 
“Bad news” 
payoff  
reverts to q 
Temporal Order 
oin time 
Bust 
Price falls, as does 
equity,  𝑒 < 𝑒 
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𝑞′ − 𝑧 > 𝑝0 ); in which case a return  to the initial price would take equilibrium below the ’band’ of sustainable 
outcomes and wipe out the entire equity of VaR investors.  
Such a large shock, though sufficient for insolvency, is not necessary. The example in Table 1 and Figure 2 
demonstrates that, even where the initial equilibrium price lies inside the higher band of downside risk (i.e. where  
𝑝0 > 𝑞′ − 𝑧), a reversal of good news can nevertheless lead to insolvency. In the figure, increasing the expected 
payoff from q to q’  shifts equilibrium from L to H as discussed; and, as  L remains within the ‘band of 
sustainability’ associated with q’,  it might appear that a reversal  is sustainable. This is not so, however, as the 
asymmetry of capital gains (applied to initial holdings  at L) and the capital losses (applied to expanded holdings at 
H) is sufficient to wipe out  the equity of the active investors, leading to a ‘bust’ with equilibrium at point I where 
Investment Banks are insolvent leaving all risk assets  in the hands of mean-variance investors11.  
Clearly accounting rules can have a marked effect on the dynamic response of the system to exogenous shocks; 
for large shocks that get reversed, indeed, VaR investors may become insolvent, leaving it to others to stabilise 
prices. In the context of a model with uniformly-distributed, bounded risk, this would be classified as a ‘zero 
probability event’- an outcome that takes prices lower than the realistically worst case outcome foreseen by the 
banks  at H. We do not believe it should be discounted, however, for two reasons. First because the design of the 
VaR regime was flawed in that it left unchecked the pecuniary externalities which can drive the system outside 
the bounds expected by individual banks; so the exaggerated impact of common shocks would indeed come as an 
unanticipated surprise. Second, because Shin’s model may be expanded to allow for unbounded downside risk so 
long as there is insurance to cover tail risk: but the possibility of financial crisis will persist if the insurers, in turn, 
fail to internalise these pecuniary externalities.  
‘Catastrophic’ behaviour?  
                                                          
11 This need not be the case for smaller shocks, where the asymmetry of gains and losses will lead to a contraction of market 
share for VaR investors, but not insolvency. In terms of Figure 2, the outcome of reversing ‘good news’ of only  dq=0.2, for 
example, is that equilibrium will shift to the left of L as Investment Banks reduce their holdings to about 20% of the market.   
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The Shin model appears to sustain the three charges made against Basel II in Danielsson et al. (2011), namely 
that: (i) VaR can destabilise and induce crashes when they would not otherwise occur; (ii) heavy reliance on CRAs 
is misguided; and (iii) financial regulation is pro-cyclical. The obvious weakness in this narrative of crisis is that it is 
driven by a sequence of unanticipated, exogenous quality shocks attributable to the activities of CRAs12.  
For large enough shocks, indeed, it seems that the price of risky assets can exhibit what Zeeman (1974) and 
Arnold (1984) refer to as ‘catastrophic’ behaviour – highly asymmetric responses to symmetric movements in 
exogenous forces.  In the paper referenced, Christopher Zeeman sought to explain the gradual rise in equity 
prices in a boom followed by the sharp fall in the subsequent crash by the difference in behaviour between ‘bulls 
and bears’ – a psychological explanation that Arnold (1984) criticized as rather ad hoc. In the case we are 
discussing, the key psychological assumption is of relentless profit-maximising  behaviour on the part of 
investment banks; with the  resulting dynamics derived explicitly from the ‘rules of the game’ – VaR rules 
sanctioned by Basel II to check moral hazard on the one hand; and  market accounting regulations (FAS 157 in 
particular) designed to ensure fair asset pricing on the other.  
A complementary, time-series approach to explaining this boom/bust behaviour has been explored by Aymanns 
et al. (2016). In their Minsky-like extension of Shin’s model, asset quality is assessed, not by ratings, but from 
time-series estimates of downside risk made in a stochastic setting where there are shocks in demand from 
patient investors. As time moves on and the last crisis moves into the distant past, these assessments become 
progressively rosier, and the system more risk-prone – leading to another crisis. In fact, they derive an ever-
repeated cycle of a slowly building price bubble followed by a crash which, they claim, is consistent with the 
operation of the Basel II rules on prudential regulation.   
Section 2 The second narrative: MBS as ‘lemons’ 
                                                          
12 Altering the ‘common knowledge’ assumption, as in the next section, helps to remedy this. 
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Shin’s Investment Banking model assumes common knowledge as to the quality of risk assets on the market; but 
the possibility of Investment Banks getting favourable ratings for assets known to be high-risk challenges this. 
Could it be that, in reality, the ‘good news’ shocks discussed above were due to ‘inflated ratings’ secured by the 
banks; and the ‘bad news’ was when the mis-rating came to light?  For, as Akerlof and Shiller (2015, p.36) argue, 
the degree of risk involved was grossly understated, as rating agencies – skilled in assessing repayment prospects 
for the debt of corporations and sovereigns – were paid by the banks to give favourable ratings to complex 
financial products whose properties defied conventional analysis. 
Adverse selection and the securitisation of subprime assets 
It turns out that, as well as holding asset backed securities on their balance sheets, Investment Banks played a key 
role in the growth of securitization, as graphically described by Gillian Tett in Fool’s Gold.  To analyse the role of 
Investment Banks and the credit rating agencies (CRAs) in packaging and marketing MBS, we turn to the adverse 
selection model of Akerlof (1970) under various assumptions about information as to quality. First we describe 
the inefficient low-trade equilibrium that Akerlof’s analysis predicts given asymmetry of knowledge of quality  
between buyers and sellers. As this is so inefficient relative to the outcome with symmetric knowledge, the 
question is whether CRAs succeeded in restoring informational  symmetry by delivering true quality ratings; or 
whether, as argued by  Akerlof and Shiller, there was ‘mining of reputation’ by the CRAs providing rosy ratings 
designed to please the Investment Banks. In the latter case, we show how ‘rating inflation’ allows sellers to collect 
more than the assets are worth in an equilibrium with ’cheating’. But when buyers discover evidence of mis-rating  
the result could be market collapse. 
Asymmetric information  
Let there be a pool of risky assets, each indexed by 𝜃, a measure of ‘quality’.13 Assume that the price of risky 
assets is determined by risk-averse investors in a competitive market. With full information, the price of asset 𝜃  
can be normalized to be  𝜃. In what follows, we characterise pricing in competitive equilibrium under asymmetric 
                                                          
13 Thus if all risky assets have the same expected returns but differ in their standard deviations, the parameter 𝜃 would 
represent the inverse of the standard deviation.  
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information. The information structure is that the support and the distribution of 𝜃 is common knowledge to both 
the banks and the investors, but only the banks know the quality of any given risky asset. The risky assets are 
“packaged" and held or sold on by Investment Banks who assign reservation values to these assets denoted r(𝜃) 
where r(𝜃) < 𝜃. 
The pool of the risky assets available constitutes a set [𝜃; 𝜃], with the measure of quality below 𝜃 represented by 
a cumulative distribution function F(𝜃). Given the asymmetry of information as to quality, let there be a single 
price p reflecting the average riskiness of assets made available at that price. As banks will only supply these 
assets if the market price covers their reservation value, 𝑟(𝜃), the amount of risky assets supplied at any given 
price, is defined as:    𝛩(𝑝) = {𝜃: r(𝜃) ≤ p}  and a competitive equilibrium may be defined as a price 𝑝∗ and a set                                                                         
𝛩∗ of risky assets such that 𝛩∗(𝑝) = {𝜃: r(𝜃) ≤ 𝑝∗}    and 𝑝∗ =  𝐸[𝜃 l 𝜃 𝜀 𝛩∗].   Together these imply that the 
competitive price must satisfy   𝑝∗ =  𝐸[𝜃 l r(𝜃) ≤ 𝑝∗]  i.e. that it matches the expected value of the assets on the 
market, which have reservation values less than the equilibrium price. (Those with higher reservation value are 
withdrawn.)  
Uniform distribution of quality 
For convenience, let the pool of the risky assets be uniformly distributed in [𝜃; 𝜃], with ‘reservation values’ of  
r(𝜃) = αθ < 𝜃.  Note that, If the equilibrium price is p, the set of risky assets offered by banks is (𝑝) =
{𝜃: r(𝜃) ≤ p} = {θ:αθ ≤ p} , so the conditional expectation of the quality of assets can be determined as:   
𝐸[𝜃 l 𝜃 𝜀 𝛩(𝑝)] =  
(
𝑝
𝛼
)+𝜃
2
  ; and  competitive equilibrium,  given by the condition that price matches the expected 
quality, is  𝑝∗  =   
𝜃
2−𝛼−1
 .  Figure 4 illustrates.  
For prices falling between the lowest and highest ‘reservation values’ 𝑟(𝜃) and 𝑟(𝜃), the expected quality will lie 
on the schedule labelled BT running from the lower bound 𝜃 at B to the mean ?̃? at T.  Competitive equilibrium is 
at E, where BT crosses the 45 degree line: this is the ‘rational expectations’ equilibrium of Akerlof (1970), where 
the market price is, on average, justified by quality. Since  only lower quality assets are put on the market, 
however, it is clearly inefficient relative to the symmetric information case, where price matches quality on each 
and all the MBS will be on the market, as indicated by the dashed section of the 45 degree line between 𝜃 and 𝜃.  
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Figure 4. Market equilibria with Asymmetric and Symmetric information 
Faking the ratings  
For sellers to bundle loans into ‘tranches’ of similar quality would seem to offer obvious efficiency gains: In the 
limit, if the grading is fine enough, Pareto efficiency might be achieved where all loans are traded and average 
quality rises to ?̃? 14. With asymmetry of information, the temptation for sellers to indulge in ‘grade inflation’ calls 
for third party authentication, e.g. by CRAs. But with collusion between the sellers of MBS and the CRAs – where 
the latter are prepared to raise quality ratings in order to retain business – grade inflation will not be checked. 
 
With the spread of quality uniformly distributed in [𝜃; 𝜃] and equilibrium with adverse selection at E, correct 
authentication could add to the average value of MBS traded and, in principle, deliver mean quality of ?̃?, as 
indicated in Figure 4 above.  With collusion between the sellers and the CRAs, however, buyers can be misled as 
to asset quality. Assume for example that with ‘grade inflation’ the lower bound remains unchanged, but the 
upper bound apparently increases to 𝜃′, where 𝜃′ − 𝜃 = 2(𝜃 − 𝜃) i.e. the spread has doubled, so the apparent 
                                                          
14 as in the symmetric information case described earlier. 
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quality range of authenticated assets on the market now has a mean value at 𝜃, the high end of the actual 
distribution.  
The dashed line labelled MM in Figure 5 illustrates graphically how buyers are being misled, with the slope of less 
than 45 degrees indicating how the price/quality relationship is being distorted (with the overstating of product 
quality increasing as quality rises). If these distorted ratings are taken at face value, all assets will be traded but 
prices will systematically exceed actual quality (except at the very bottom). The average price paid will be ?̃?, as 
indicated on the horizontal axis, which will exceed the average quality shown as ?̃? on the vertical axis, with 
‘overpayment’ averaging ?̃? −  ?̃?, as indicated by the parenthesis in the figure. With buyers being systematically 
mi-led as to quality, this is no ‘rational expectations’ equilibrium: differential information is actively being 
exploited to the advantage of those who know the true quality of the MBS that they are mis-selling15.  
 
Figure 5. Deception: market equilibrium with inflated ratings 
What happens when the music stops and buyers discover that most of the loans are not, in fact, worth what they 
were led to expect? What if the ratings are totally disregarded, with prices determined as for equilibrium with 
                                                          
15 In this respect it differs from models such as that of Di Tella (2017), where intermediaries have known incentives to ‘steal’ 
but markets adjust so that, in equilibrium, there is no stealing. In choosing between such different perspectives, legal findings 
can play an important role. 
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adverse selection, for example -  and, for good measure, buyers also shift their beliefs to the detriment of MBS - 
by reducing the lower bound on quality to zero?  
 
Figure 6. Disillusion: downside revision of sellers’ distribution, leading to collapse. 
In that case, despite the quality being as originally specified, with bounds  𝜃 > 𝜃  > 0, the jaundiced beliefs of the 
buyers, with bounds  𝜃 > 𝜃′ = 0, will now imply the schedule of expected quality (from the viewpoint of the 
buyers)  shown as B’T’ in Figure 6. As this lies everywhere below the 45 degree line showing actual quality - except 
at the origin - sellers will find their asset quality systematically undervalued. So the market will collapse to the 
origin, the no-trade equilibrium of Akerlof (1970), arrived at here by excessively pessimistic beliefs.  
Thus it seems that asymmetric information – and its exploitation by banks working in collusion with the rating 
agencies (to whom prudential regulation had effectively been delegated)  - can  generate a boom/bust sequence 
like that discussed  in the previous section. But here the ‘shocks’ to asset quality are essentially endogenous. This 
does not make the financial accelerator that Shin emphasizes irrelevant: far from it. The impact of these 
developments, both positive and negative, on the equity base of the banks involved will have amplified effects on 
industry equilibrium, rendering implosion more likely.  
 If the subprime crisis merits the description of a perfect storm, it is because it involves so many contributory 
factors. The two narratives discussed so far feature the challenges to financial market efficiency and stability 
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coming from pecuniary externalities and asymmetric information. How these may best be combined is left as 
unfinished business, for, like the elephant in the parable, reality is undeniably complicated16. In the next section, 
we turn to another feature - creditor panic.  
Section 3 The third narrative: baseless panic 
There is a third perspective, with special appeal to those familiar with the Asian financial crisis of 1997-99 -   like 
Paul Krugman (2018, p.158 ),  who writes: ‘when the crisis struck, I’m sure I wasn’t the only economist whose 
reaction was not ‘How can this be happening?’ but rather to yell at oneself, ‘Diamond–Dybvig, you idiot!’  He 
refers to the classic 1983 paper where banks can face insolvency when depositors panic and they are forced, in 
emergency,  to recall good but illiquid loans. But is this still relevant when the miracle of securitisation can - by 
packaging  loans into saleable securities  - apparently banish illiquidity? Were sub-prime mortgages not 
successfully pooled and sliced into securities – many rated AAA - with widespread investor appeal, see Table 1?  
A widely-cited paper presented to central bankers and academics at Jackson Hole with the title ‘The Panic of 
2007’ provided cold comfort for the view that securitisation guaranteed saleability: for what Gary Gorton (2009) 
claimed to show was that the market for securities was itself prone to fits of baseless panic.  The principal piece 
of evidence (provided by one who had worked as a consultant for the insurance company AIG Financial 
Products17 ) was the alarming increase in the cost of buying insurance against losses on subprime mortgages, as 
measured by the ABX-HE indices. Fig. 7 shows the movements in the BBB and AA versions of this index, 
constructed from January 2006, each reflecting the cost of purchasing insurance for investment-grade tranches 
of twenty major MBS products18 . While both indices initially stood at par, the relatively riskier ABX-HE-BBB 
index began to fall at the beginning of 2007; and both fell sharply after August 2007 - the date that, according to 
Gorton, the Panic began.  Continued precipitous decline took the BBB down to about 5c in late 2008; by which 
                                                          
16 Yifan Zhang (2017) provides an elegant, if stylised, combination of these two narratives in one analytical framework. 
17 see Lewis (2011, p.88). 
18 Thus a price of 80 for a particular AA contract on a given date means that the buyer must pay 20% of the par value of 
the AAA index to get protection for the next five years. 
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time even the less risky ABX-HE-AA index was down to 20c, implying up-front insurance costs of 80c in the 
dollar! 
 
Figure 7 US House prices, ABX indices, and share prices of Global Banks. Source: A. Milne (2009, p. 201) 
Why the panic: opacity or fundamentals?  
According to  Gorton (2009, p.199), the reason behind this enormous increase in the cost of insuring MBS lay not 
in any failure of securitisation as such,  but in the ‘loss of information’ involved it involved - and the consequent 
‘opacity’ of MBS securities in terms of their asset backing.  This view was robustly challenged by Bengt Holmstrom 
(2009, p. 267),  who , in his commentary, argued that the fault lay with the business model of subprime finance:  
              The problem with sub-prime related securities was not the lack of transparency as such... the real 
problem was the sensitivity of the MBSs to a fall in the average house price. ... The dynamic credit 
enhancement model only worked as long as house prices were rising, a point that seems obvious in 
retrospect.   
For the finance provided when house prices were rising would cease when house prices stopped rising, or began 
to fall; and, with no refinancing, borrowers would be unable to avoid the scheduled step-up in ‘teaser’ rates 
(possibly doubling). If house prices were falling, moreover, they would need to post more collateral or pay down 
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the loan. As borrowers in default, they could become homeless as their homes were repossessed and resold into 
a falling market19. 
 For Akerlof and Shiller, the deliberate  misuse of  securitisation was how the better informed could exploit 
asymmetries of information for profit - a prime example of ’phishing for phools’. If securitisation is misused in this 
way, of course, the challenge it poses to the Diamond/ Dybvig perspective – by making  bank assets as liquid as 
their liabilities – is only too likely to fail. More than that, when misuse is revealed, there will be evidence of 
unsound investment for all to see  – just what is needed to trigger creditor panic, driven by chicanery not 
sunspots !  
That investment banks were seriously exposed to liquidity risk there is no question:  ‘the use of overnight repos 
became so prevalent that, at its peak, Wall Street investment banks were rolling over a quarter of their balance 
sheets every night’, Shin (2010, p.156, italics added).  Some have argued that, by retaining mainly super-senior 
tranches on their books - with insurance to cover residual risk - and by assigning riskier tranches to special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs), investment banks were immune from insolvency risk. But for banks intimately involved in 
the business of subprime securitisation to protest that their hands were spotlessly clean was like Lady Macbeth 
rubbing her hands to wash off any trace of the death of Duncan. It was a strategy that failed: for, in the event, 
investment banks had to take responsibility for their SPVs; and the prevalence of interbank lending and borrowing 
provided abundant channels for contagion20.  
Section 4 Policy Actions and Legal Proceedings  
Liquidity provision by the Fed 
                                                          
19 As the Case-Shiller index of House Prices plotted in Figure 7 above indicates, property prices in main US cities peaked in the 
third quarter of 2006, and went on to decline by about 30% over the next two and a half years. This – the timing of house 
price rises and declines – supports Holmstrom’s analysis.  
 
20 The liquidity shock suffered by a bank with good assets could be the consequence of withdrawals by another bank 
suffering equity losses from poor asset quality, leading it to reduce its balance sheet. 
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Decisive action was taken by the Fed to help provide liquidity in the crisis. Thus in March 2008 the Fed created a 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility making it easier to lend to security firms by widening the range of eligible collateral. 
Furthermore, when Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs – both “enthusiastic practitioners of the new Wall Street 
model that combined sky-high leverage with heavy reliance on short-term borrowing” – faced a debilitating loss 
of credit in September 2008, they were granted the status of Bank Holding Companies fully entitled to support by 
the central bank ”thereby pulling the two beleaguered companies inside the Fed’s safety net. That stopped the 
runs.” Blinder (2013, pp. 153, 4).  
But this action to extend the safety net was taken in what Blinder calls ‘The Panic of 2008’, when the structural 
problems of subprime lending described by Holmstrom had become apparent. This hardly supports Gorton’s 
thesis - that the primary driver of the financial crisis was ‘the Panic of 2007’ due to the opacity of the products 
created to securitise loans to subprime households. In the words of Janet Yellen (2017), “the deterioration from 
early 2007 until early September 2008 was a slow trickle compared to the tidal wave that nearly wiped out the 
financial sector that September”. Creditors panicked, it seems, when they realised that lending on sub-prime 
mortgages was a bad investment.   
Capital injections by the US Treasury: official purchase of preference shares  
For Shin, the widespread take-up of low-quality subprime assets by HLIs at a time when measured risks seemed 
low was the key factor, leaving them exposed to insolvency as and when ‘bad news’ arrived.  This perspective, 
that the ‘fair weather’ expansion strategy posed the risk of insolvency when storm clouds appeared, finds support 
in the action taken by the US Treasury in October 2008. Alongside losses and write-downs totalling $344b 
incurred in 2007/8, Table 2 provides details of the principal capital injections21 made by the US Treasury using 
TARP funds, running to a total of almost $100b for the banks in the table.  
Table 2  Big Five Investment banks and survivors of the Big Eight: losses, capital injection, fines 
The ‘Big Five’  
US 
Investment 
Assets, 
Leverage, 
Fate after 
crisis 
‘Big Eight’ Credit losses and 
write downs 
2007-8 
Capital 
injections 
Subsequent  
fines for 
                                                          
21 Enforced purchases of preference shares. 
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Banks (as of 
early 2008) 
and equity 
end 2007  
Banks  
(Current 
Survivors) 
October 
2008 
 Mis-selling 
of MBS 
Goldman 
Sachs  
$1,120b 
(26; $43b)* 
Became a 
Bank H Co  
in Sep 2008 
Goldman 
Sachs 
$10b      ( 0.7 )**  $10b $5b 
Morgan 
Stanley  
$1,045b 
(33; $32b) 
Became a 
Bank H Co in 
Sep 2008 
Morgan 
Stanley 
$19b      (2.1 )  $10b $3b 
Merrill Lynch $1,020 
(32; $32b) 
T/O by Bank 
of America, 
Sep, 2008 
Bank of 
America 
ML:  $73b  (7.5) 
BoA: $57b (1.8)  
$25b  $17b  
(+$37b set 
aside) 
Lehman Bros $691b 
(31; $22b) 
Liquidation, 
Sep 2008 
_ $30b       (5.0 ) _ _ 
Bear Sterns $396b 
(33; $12b) 
 
T/O  by J P 
Morgan, Mar 
2008 
J P Morgan  $41b       (2.8 ) $25b   $13b  
   Citigroup  $114b     (4.0 ) $25b  $7b  
Totals  $4,272b 
IBs only 
  $344b $95b  $45b  
Notes: *Figures in brackets are leverage, Assets / Equity, followed by Equity. ** Figure in brackets shows ratio of 
losses and write downs to 2006 pre-tax earnings.  Sources: Losses: Milne (2009, p.249); Injections:  Sorkin (2009, 
p.524); Fines: (DoJ web reports) 
For a pure liquidity crisis, where the investments of the banks are not in question, capital support should not be 
needed. But in this case -  with house prices already falling, subprime insurance prohibitively expensive, the MBS 
market essentially closed down and losses on the books of investment banks amounting to a third of a trillion 
dollars - such solvency support was considered essential.  As Blinder notes:  ‘most banks were presumably 
undercapitalized on a mark-to-market basis at the time. They needed capital desperately, and most of them could 
not raise it on the dire circumstances of October 2008. ... Equity injections would improve banks’ capital positions 
directly’. 
Mis-selling of MBS:  Phishing for Phools?  
The asymmetric information account of Akerlof and Shiller is based explicitly on ‘the economics of manipulation 
and deception’. Support for their challenging perspective comes from legal decisions subsequent to the crisis. The 
final column of Table 2 indicates the  ‘fines’ on the Investment Banks themselves - settlements agreed to with 
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Federal and/or State prosecutors for having misled other investors as to the quality of the MBS they sold22. The 
sums paid by investment banks and the big commercial banks such as  Bank of America, J P Morgan and Citigroup 
amount to $45b  (of which $8b was levied on the two surviving investment banks,  and $20b on the big banks that 
had taken over Bear Sterns and Merill Lynch).  
The largest fines – and some of the most chilling evidence – comes from the case against Bank of America which, 
in addition to acquiring Merill Lynch, had earlier taken over Countrywide Financial, the largest lender of subprime 
mortgages in the US.  At a press conference where the settlement against Bank of America was announced, Eric 
Holder, the U.S. attorney general, is on record as saying:   
These financial institutions knowingly, routinely, falsely, and fraudulently marked and sold these loans as 
sound and reliable investments. Worse still, on multiple occasions – when confronted with concerns 
about their reckless practices – bankers at these institutions continued to mislead investors about their 
own standards and to securitize loans with fundamental credit, compliance, and legal defects. 
Collusion with CRAs? 
The allegation of collusion between Credit Rating Agencies and investment banks has also been the subject of 
court proceedings; with fines imposed on the two major agencies. In February, 2015  S&P settled for a fine of 
$1.5b – and it was reported that  ‘S&P executives admitted that they made decisions about testing and rating 
CDOs based at least partly on the effect they might have on relationships with the banks issuing them’. In January 
of 2017, Moody’s settled for a sum of $0.9b. Both credit rating agencies have thus agreed to pay substantial 
settlements for mis-rating; with S&P admitting what Akerlof and Shiller (2015) allege, namely that the ratings 
were influenced by the incentives to retain the business. 
Summary overview  
Various narratives offered by seasoned observers have been presented – each apparently sufficient to cause 
financial crisis. But the policy actions to support the institutions involved – and the fines subsequently imposed 
upon them – suggest that all three narratives had a part to play. In a speech a decade after the crisis began, Janet 
                                                          
22 Why the legal settlements have taken the form of ‘deferred prosecution agreements’ with the companies involved, 
rather than the criminal prosecution of high-level individuals, is discussed in Rakoff (2014). 
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Yellen, as chair of the Federal Reserve, endorsed a multi-faceted approach, noting that: “the vulnerabilities within 
the financial system in the mid-2000s were numerous and, in hindsight, familiar from past financial panics”.  She 
went on to observe that:  
In response, policymakers around the world have put in place measures to limit a future build  up of 
similar vulnerabilities, ...Preeminent among these domestic and global efforts have been steps to increase 
the loss-absorbing capacity of banks, regulations to limit both maturity transformation in short-term 
funding markets and liquidity mismatches within banks, and new authorities to facilitate the resolution of 
large financial institutions and to subject systemically important firms to more stringent prudential 
regulation.  Yellen (2017) (italics added) 
Whether this will succeed in preventing another crisis one cannot tell: but it is an acknowledgement of the many-
sided nature of the problem. 
Section 5  Conclusion   
Given mark-to-market accounting and the usual VaR conventions, highly-leveraged investment banks could, 
according to the first narrative, face insolvency due to exogenous common shocks to fundamentals. It appears, 
however, that the shocks were in practice endogenous – due to the mis-selling of subprime assets by investment 
banks, assisted by excessively favourable assessments on the part of rating agencies. Rather than some ‘rational 
expectations’ equilibrium with common knowledge, the legal evidence supports the allegation of the second 
narrative – that there was a ‘cheating’ equilibrium leading to crisis when the truth emerged.  
That financial institutions who need to roll over a quarter of their balance sheets on a nightly basis should be 
exposed to creditor panic –as in the third narrative - is uncontroversial. What is controversial is to maintain that 
the subprime crisis was caused by unreasoning panic based on product opacity, rather than fear triggered by bad 
news about the flawed business model. 
The three perspectives provide plausible threats to financial stability coming from different directions - tempting 
one to ask: which is correct?  As the parable of the elephant suggests, however, each may provide a partial 
perspective of a complex reality that involves them all. The actions of policy-makers and the courts support this 
conclusion - as does the ex-post assessment of the then-chair of the US Federal Reserve. 
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 Annex A   Amplification effect of pecuniary externality  
How to determine the effect of unchecked pecuniary externality in Shin’s model? To derive this formally, as in 
Rastapana ( 2017), note first how, with mark-to-market gains following an improvement in asset quality, the 
previously binding VaR constraint is relaxed and the new equity level of active investors is given by: 
𝑒′ = 𝑝′𝑦 − (𝑞 − 𝑧)𝑦      (A1) 
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where  𝑝′𝑦  denotes  assets revalued at new prices and (𝑞 − 𝑧)𝑦 is pre-existing level of borrowing. The increased 
equity value allows active investors to take more risky assets onto their balance sheets. Assume that these 
expand until the VaR constraint is again binding, so:  
𝑒′ = 𝑝′𝑦′ − (𝑞′ − 𝑧′)𝑦′      (A2) 
where y’ denotes the new optimal holdings of risky assets held by active investors, and the improved asset quality 
is indicated by 𝑞′ > 𝑞, 𝑧′ < 𝑧.  
For the holding of risky assets by active portfolio managers, given the market clearing condition  𝑦𝑃′ + 𝑦𝐴
′ = 1 
,equations (A1) and (A2) imply the expanded level of asset holdings following such favourable shocks is: 
𝑦𝐴
′ = 𝑦𝐴 (1 +
(𝑞′ − 𝑞) − (𝑧′ − 𝑧)
𝑝′ − 𝑞′ + 𝑧′
) 
or 
𝑦𝐴
′ − 𝑦𝐴 = 𝑦𝐴 (
(𝑞′−𝑞)−(𝑧′−𝑧)
𝑧′−
𝑧′2
3𝜏
(1−𝑦𝐴′)
)     (A3) 
Glossary23 
AAA: triple A – top rating for bonds with exceptional degree of credit-worthiness   
ABS:  Asset-Backed Security -  security that is backed by a portfolio of assets, normally placed in a specially 
designated vehicle (see SPV).   
ABX-HE: a CDS contract that pools lists of exposures to mortgage backed securities.  
Bank holding company:  broadly defined as any company that has control over a bank. In 2008 
traditional investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, converted to bank holding companies 
in order to gain better access to liquidity and funding. 
Basel Accords: regulations drawn up by the Basel Committee of Banking Spervisors that establidshed levels of 
bank capital judged necessatry for financial stability. Basel I was drawn up in 1988; Basel II in 2004.  
CDO of ABS: collateralized debt obligation built out of Asset Backed Securities, usually Mortgage Backed 
Securities  
CDS: Credit Default Swap - insurance style contract where the buyer pays a regular fee for  guarantee of 
compensation by seller in event of default on a stipulated piece ofdebt 
CRA: Credit Rating Agency – private company that assigns ratings (AAA and down) of creditworhiness - ability to 
service debt; the ‘Big Three’ agencies are Moody’s Investors Services, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratimgs.  
HLI: Highly Leveraged Institution-  a company or other institution with a high debt to equity ratio 
MBS:Mortgage-Backed Security – bonds issued by SPV holding a portfolio of mortgages 
Leverage: ratio of debt to equity 
                                                          
23 With due acknowledgement to GillianTett (2009). 
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 Repo: transaction where one party (‘borrower’) sells ecurities to another ( ‘lender’) with a commitment to 
repurchase at a future date at a specified price 
Securitisation: issuance of tradable securities, such as bonds, backed by the income generated by loans or other 
sources of revenue  
Shadow banking: a diverse set of institutions and markets that, collectively, carry out traditional banking 
functions — but do so outside, or in ways only loosely linked to, the traditional system of regulated depository 
institutions. The shadow banking system includes SPVs, Repo markets, Investment Banks and and Mortgage 
companies 
SPV: Special Purpose Vehicle -  shell company created to hold a portfolio of assets and issue securities backed by    
them. It may be created by a bank, but is a separate legal entity.  
Super-senior risk: the most senior part of capital structure of a CDO 
 TARP : Troubled Assets Relief Program – the Federal program enacted in late 2008 authorizing $700 billion for 
capital injections and other measures to stabilize the banking system  
Tranche: subset of ABS or MBS securities on issue that carry a certain level of risk  
 VaR : Value at Risk - the realistically worst case outcome in the sense that anything worse only happens with 
probabiity less than some benchmark level, Shin (2010, p.16)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
